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RUSSELL V HILL (N.C. 1899)
MISUNDERSTOOD LESSONS
JOHN V. ORTH*
In this essay, Professor Orth examines the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion in Russell v. Hill, which has long been
unfavorably compared with the contemporaneous Minnesota case
of Anderson v. Gouldberg. Both cases concerned claims to
property by two parties, neither of whom was the true owner, and
both cases relied on the venerable common law case of Armory v.
Delamirie. Professor Orth explains that the North Carolina
court's decision resulted from strict insistence upon the elements of
the common law forms of action. In contrast, the Minnesota
court, broadly construing precedent, made a policy choice which
it believed would best protect property. Professor Orth concludes,
however, that the North Carolina court's decision has proved to be
no less protective
Russell v. Hill' is, in its way, one of the most famous cases ever
decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court, but it has an
unenviable fame because most right-thinking lawyers today think it
was wrongly decided.2 A staple of first-year property courses,3 the
case involved a claim by Russell for the value of logs that the
partnership of Hill and Nelson had taken from his possession without
authority.4 Plaintiff honestly but mistakenly believed that the logs
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Gibson D. Smith, a law student
and the author's research assistant, who painstakingly assembled the original materials.
1. 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899).
2. See, eg., BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTsHELL 139 (2d ed.
1993) (saying of Russell, "[t]here is much wrong with this analysis"); Recent Case, 13
HARV. L. REV. 607 (1900) (noting Russell and concluding that "the doctrine of the
principal case seems indefensible").
3. See, e.g., OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 41-42 (5th ed. 1989)
(misdating Russell as 1900); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY 140-41 (6th ed. 1990) (same); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 54 (2d ed. 1993).
4. Russell, 125 N.C. at 471, 34 S.E. at 640.
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were his; defendants showed that title was in a third person.5 The
case was tried in the Superior Court for Swain County, North
Carolina, on an agreed statement of facts, and judgment was rendered
in favor of defendants.6 The state supreme court affirmed the
judgment, holding that title was an essential element of plaintiff's case
and that, while possession raised a presumption of title, that
presumption had been rebutted in this case.7 Russell is usually paired
in the property books with a contemporary case on similar facts from
Minnesota, Anderson v. Gouldberg,8 which held for plaintiff. The
latter case is normally understood as deciding that possession, even if
wrongfully acquired, gives a title that defendants can defeat only by
proving a better title in themselves, not in a third person.'
The logic of Anderson is compelling: Plaintiff should not have to
prove title in order to recover the value of something taken from his
possession without authority, so defendants should only be able to
defeat the claim by proving their own title, not by disproving
plaintiffs. In terms of civil procedure, plaintiff should be able to
establish a prima facie case by showing prior possession and defen-
dants' unauthorized taking; defendants' only affirmative defense on
the merits should be a showing of better title in themselves (or
authority from one with such a title). Learned discussions usually
conclude with a restatement of the rule in Anderson in terms of the
Latin phrase jus tertii (the right of a third person):" defendants in
an action for wrongful taking cannot assert jus tertii." This third
person is not party to the suit, does not put in a claim, and will not be
bound by any judgment respecting title. Were a court to leave the
thing or its value with defendants just because plaintiff could not
prove title, it would render rights in personal property precarious,
5. Id. at 471-72, 34 S.E. at 640.
6. It at 471, 34 S.E. at 640.
7. Id. at 472, 34 S.E. at 640.
8. 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892). A more complete statement of the facts appears in the
Minnesota Reports, 51 Minn. 294 (1892).
9. See, eg., RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 311-12
(Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975) (citing Anderson for the proposition that "even
a convertor who tortiously holds the goods of another has been held able to recover their
value from a third person who, while the goods were in the plaintiff's possession, damaged
or converted them"). But see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
95 n.18 (3d ed. 1964) (citing Anderson as a case in which plaintiff was in possession "under
some colorable claim of right").
10. See Russ VERSTEEG, ESSENTIAL LATIN FOR LAWYERS 89 (1990).
11. See, eg., John Frederick Hurlbut, Note, Jas Tertii as a Defense to Conversion Suits
in Indiana-Toward a More Rational Approach, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 415, 427-28 (1984).
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since most chattels are without title deeds and a system of recording.
Furthermore, were the third party never to assert a claim against
defendants, the latter would receive a benefit from wrongdoing. 2
Denied a legal remedy, plaintiff would be tempted to take the law
into his own hands. "Any other rule would lead," the Minnesota
court summed up the consequences in Anderson, "to an endless series
of unlawful seizures and reprisals in every case where property had
once passed out of the possession of the rightful owner."'
How could the North Carolina Supreme Court have blundered
so badly? Examination of the original trial records in Russell reveals
that the case was a tangle of misunderstandings. Beginning with a
mistake concerning title to land, it became through an error of trial
tactics a case to try title to chattels rather than to protect possession.
The records show that the litigation spanned ten years, beginning in
1889 with Hill v. Russell.'4 In 1894, following a voluntary nonsuit in
that action, the principal case began. Delayed by continuances and
procedural mishaps, Russell v. Hill required two rounds over six years,
including two trials and two trips to the state's highest court, before
final resolution in 1899."5 On its second appeal, this routine dispute
forced the North Carolina Supreme Court to examine its precedents
and attempt to distinguish the celebrated eighteenth century English
case of Armory v. Delamirie,"6 which involved a chimney sweeper's
boy who found a jewel.
Extrinsic to Russell is yet another misunderstanding. In legal
pedagogy, discussion usually centers on the perceived implications for
public policy of deciding in favor of defendants: Law students
dutifully parrot the lesson that this will lead to "an endless series of
unlawful seizures and reprisals." In fact, there is no reason to believe
that a century of experience with contrasting rules in North Carolina
and Minnesota shows any real difference in this regard.
12. On the legal principle traditionally expressed as "no one should be permitted to
profit from his own wrong," see RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23
(1978) (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 40-41 (1921) (same).
13. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892).
14. The case history of Hill v. Russell can be gathered from the Statement of the Case
on Appeal in Russell and from the Swain County Court Minute Books. See infra notes
24,29-32 and accompanying text.
15. Russell I, 122 N.C. 773, 30 S.E. 27 (1898); Russell 11, 125 N.C. 470, 30 S.E. 640
(1899).
16. 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
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In terms of legal historiography, a study of Russell raises a
question about the value of extended historical reconstructions of
well-known cases: How does such a study affect classroom discus-
sion? Aside from adding verisimilitude to what would otherwise be,
merely a hypothetical question concerningjus tertii, historical research
can supply important contextual information. North Carolina at the
time of Russell had recently enacted a new system for recording titles
to land, which may have created a feeling of certainty about the
identification of the logs' true owner. Furthermore, on the specific
facts of Russell, Tertius was no bodiless abstraction but had in fact a
name and identity: EH. Busbee, one of the state's leading lawyers,
a man well known to every member of the supreme court that
decided the case.
Finally, reflection on Russell and its contrasting case, Anderson,
prompts a suggestion for restatement of the substantive law. What is
troubling about Russell is the concern that an innocent person may be
without remedy against a wrongful taker merely because the
wrongdoer can assert jus tertii, while what is troubling about Anderson
is the concern that a party can defend possession even if wrongfully
acquired. Both problems may be avoided by a rule that conditions
the assertion of jus tertii on a showing that the prior possessor did not
hold in good faith.
I. THE FACTS IN RUSSELL
As lawyers and judges are acutely aware, discovering what
actually happened in a case is often a difficult and uncertain business.
Matters are only made worse as the time of the original dispute grows
distant. In Russell the task is relatively easy because so many of the
important facts were matters of public record or were agreed upon by
the parties. For purposes of the present discussion, facts agreed upon
(and, occasionally, facts not disputed) are assumed to be true. All the
original materials, trial records and recorded deeds, are now located
in the North Carolina State Archives in Raleigh.
The facts in Russell date back to May 18, 1887, when F.H.
Busbee, who had made a prior entry and survey, received a grant
from the state for 10,297 acres in Swain County, a sparsely settled
mountain county in western North Carolina. 8 Busbee, who had paid
17. State Grant No. 8108, State to F.H. Busbee, Trustee, Swain County Register of
Deeds, Book 9, at 39 (1887).
18. In 1890 Swain County had a population of 6,577, all classified as rural. NORTH
CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1979, at 1283 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1981). The 1990
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12-1/2 cents an acre, took title in himself as trustee for an unnamed
beneficiary. 9 On June 1, 1887, Busbee recorded his patent in the
county courthouse in Bryson City' pursuant to the state's newly
adopted race-type recording act, generally known in the state as the
Connor Act.2' Less than two years later, on January 28, 1889, Iowa
McCoy made an entry and survey of a one-hundred-acre tract that she
believed to be in the public domain but that was in fact part of the
land granted to Busbee, trustee.'
In September 1889, prior to the issuance of her patent, McCoy
and Aaron Miller sold the standing timber on the land embraced in
McCoy's grant to D.S. Russell for $113.50.3 Thereafter Russell's
census reported its population as 11,268. NoRTH CAROLINA MANUAL, 1993-1994, at 1083
(Lisa A. Marcus ed., 1994).
19. The deed recites the consideration. State Grant No. 8108, supra note 17. The
Statement of the Case on Appeal certified by the presiding judge William S. O'B.
Robinson reports that at the jury trial in 1897 (Russell 1) "[t]here was no evidence to show
for whom F.H. Busbee was trustee."
20. At its foot the deed is inscribed "Registered this 1st day of June A.D., 1887," and
signed by the Register of Deeds. State Grant No. 8108, supra note 17. Although
"registered" is the term used to mean placed of record, "recorded" is the term used in this
Essay, to avoid confusion with the registration of title permitted later under the Torrens
Title Act. Act of March 8, 1913, ch. 90, 1913 N.C. Pub. Laws 147 (current version codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-1 to 43-64 (1984)).
21. Act of Feb. 27, 1885, ch. 147, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws 233 (effective Dec. 1, 1885)
(current version codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1984)). The bill that became the
North Carolina recording act was originally introduced by state Senator Henry Groves
Connor and became known by his name. See Obituary of Henry Groves Connor, NEWS
AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 24, 1924, at 1.
Grants from the state were recordable in the same manner as other deeds. Code of
North Carolina §2779 (1883) (present version in N.C. GEN. STAT. §146-55 (1991)) (grants
to be recorded within two years).
22. The fact of entry appears in Russell II, 125 N.C. at 471, 34 S.E. at 640; the date of
entry appears in the Statement of Facts agreed upon by both parties for the bench trial
in 1899 (Russell II).
23. The contract with McCoy and the consideration are described in the Statement of
Facts agreed upon by both parties for the bench trial in 1899 (Russell 11). The 1897
Statement of the Case on Appeal, certified by Judge Robinson, reports that at the jury
trial in 1897 plaintiff introduced the contract in evidence and testified as follows: "I
bought the timber in September 1889 from Aaron Miller and Iowa McCoy. I had a
written contract with McCoy and Miller." Statement of the Case on Appeal, Russell v.
Hill, 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898). Miller's interest was never explained.
Standing timber is an interest in land, so its transfer technically requires a deed.
Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N.C. 62, 64, 47 S.E. 2d 528, 529 (1948). In the present case a
contract seems to have been used, granting Russell a license to enter the land and cut the
timber and transferring to him title to the logs. The sufficiency of the contract was not
challenged in Russell.
It seems to have been taken for granted by all parties that, after entry and survey, a
person had a transferable interest in the land.
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crew entered the land and built shelters, cutting timber over the
course of several weeks. By December 16, 1889, they had transported
the logs to the banks of the Nantahala River to float them
downstream for sale. A week earlier, however, on December 10,
1889, the partnership of L.J. Hill and L.B. Nelson of Atlanta, Georgia,
through their agent in Swain County, W.S. Saul, had filed an action
in superior court against Russell and McCoy, claiming ownership of
the McCoy tract,24 and on December 18, 1889, the partners were
granted an injunction restraining Russell and McCoy.' On Decem-
ber 26, 1889, while the injunction was still in force, Saul took
possession of the logs on behalf of Hill and Nelson and sold them to
the Asheville Lumber Company for $686.84.
On February 8, 1890, McCoy received from the state the deed for
the hundred acres, for which she also paid 12-1/2 cents an acre.27
She recorded her patent on March 11, 1890.' Soon thereafter, it
appears, doubts about McCoy's title developed, and on June 12,1890,
Busbee was made a third party defendant in Hill v. Russell and a
survey was ordered.29 For a reason now unknown, Busbee moved
24. Statement of the Case on Appeal (Russell 1). The superior court was not in
session at the time, and the first judicial record of the ejectment action is in the Swain
County Court Minute Books, Spring Term 1890, at 499 (June 12, 1890). The basis of Hill
and Nelson's claimed ownership does not appear.
25. Statement of the Case on Appeal (Russell 1). The terms of the injunction were
not stated.
26. Id. (The company was also referred to in the trial records as the Asheville
Furniture and Lumber Company. In the Supreme Court's statement of the facts in Russell
II, a spurious distinction appears between a furniture company and a lumber company:
Plaintiff is said to have planned to float the logs down the Nantahala River to the
Asheville Furniture Company, but defendants sold and delivered them to the Asheville
Lumber Company, Russell v. Hill, 125 N.C. at 470, 471, 34 S.E. at 640.) By the time of
the final appeal in Russell the company was insolvent. Russell, 125 N.C. at 470, 34 S.E. at
640.
It was alleged in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in RussellH (Russell v. Hill, 125 N.C.
470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899)) that defendants had obligated themselves to the Asheville
Furniture and Lumber Company to repay the price of the logs if they failed in their action
against Russell and McCoy. Defendants in their answer denied this allegation.
27. State Grant No. 9909, State to Iowa McCoy, Swain County Register of Deeds,
Book 11, at 514. The Statement of the Case on Appeal certified by Judge Robinson
(Russell , 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898)) mistakenly identifies McCoy's deed as State
Grant No. 9009.
28. Inscription on State Grant No. 9909.
29. Swain County Court Minute Books, Spring Term 1890, at 499 (June 12, 1890).
A contemporary newspaper account establishes that F.H. Busbee was personally in
attendance: "This term of the Superior Court is of more than ordinary importance.
Several important suits are on the docket and in consequence there is a large and fine
array of legal talent in attendance. F.H. Busbee, Esq. of Raleigh, is attending court here.
He puts up at Swain Hotel." SWAIN COUNTY HERALD (N.C.), June 12, 1890, at 1.
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at the Spring Term 1891 to withdraw as party defendant? The
motion was granted at the Fall Term 1891,31 at which term Hill and
Nelson also took a judgment of nonsuit in their action against Russell
and McCoy?2
H. RUSSELL: ROUND ONE
On January 17, 1894, Russell filed suit against Hill and Nelson,
beginning Round One of the principal case.33 Continued from term
to term for three and a half years, Russell was tried to a jury on
August 6, 1897. Plaintiff, who was represented by G.S. Ferguson35
and J.E Ray,36 introduced into evidence his contract with McCoy
and Miller and testified that he had cut and removed the timber
pursuant to that contract. He also introduced the record in the case
of Hill v. Russell and testified as to the value of the timber taken by
Saul. A witness for plaintiff testified that Saul was Hill and Nelson's
agent, adding "Saul told me that he got the timber claimed by
plaintiff and sold it to the Asheville Lumber Co. He seemed to enjoy
the joke on Russell."37 In response, defendants, who were represent-
Hill v. Russell was "continued for survey" at the Fall Term 1890. Swain County Court
Minute Books, Fall Term 1890, at 530 (Nov. 6, 1890).
30. The motion "to Strike out the Interpleadings of F.H. Busbee" was continued.
Swain County Court Minute Books, Spring Term 1891, at 560 (June 11, 1891).
31. "Defendant Busbee through his counsel withdraws his answer and is permitted by
the court to withdraw as party defendant or interpleader." Swain County Minute Books,
Fall Term 1891, at 27 (Nov. 7, 1891).
32. Id. at 27 (Nov. 10, 1891). Hill and Nelson were ordered to pay costs. Id
33. Summons (Russell 1, 122 N.C. 772, 30 SE. 27 (1898)). Defendants were the
partnership of Hill and Nelson and LJ. Hill and L.B. Nelson individually. Id.
34. Swain County Court Minute Books, Spring Term 1894, at 319 (June 14,1894); Fall
Term 1894, at 393 (Nov. 29, 1894); Spring Term 1895, at 456 (June 22, 1895); Fall Term
1895, at 512 (Nov. 27, 1895); Spring Term 1896, at 40 (June 16, 1896); Fall Term 1896, at
103 (Dec. 2, 1896). Because of a backlog of cases, a special term of Swain County
Superior Court was held in August, 1897.
35. Garland S. Ferguson, a resident of Haywood County, adjacent to Swain County
on the east, had served one term in the state senate, 1876-77. NORTH CAROLINA
GOvERNMENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at 457. In 1902 he was elected to an eight year
term as a superior court judge and was re-elected in 1910. Id at 579, 598 n.98.
Also listed as counsel for plaintiff was the firm of "Jones and Johnson," with which
Ferguson seems to have been associated. On G.A. Jones, who appeared for plaintiff in
Russell H, see infra note 50.
36. J. Frank Ray of Macon County, adjacent to Swain County on the south, served in
the state house of representatives sporadically over 54 years: 1881-83, 1891-1900, 1911-13,
1917-20, 1923-24, 1935. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at
461, 463, 471-72, 474-75, 488, 491, 494, 496, 500, 510.
37. Statement of the Case on Appeal (Russell 1, 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898))
(testimony of F.R. Hewitt). Although clearly hearsay, Saul's words would seem to have
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ed by R.L. Leatherwood,3' relied on the successive deeds to Busbee
and McCoy to show that McCoy had not had any rights in the land
from which plaintiff cut the trees.
Three issues were joined for the jury:
(1) "Is Iowa McCoy the owner of the land from which the
plaintiff cut the timber purchased?"
(2) "Did the defendants wrongfully convert the personal
property, the timber, of the plaintiff?"
(3) "What is the value of said property?,
39
In his judgment, Judge W.S. O'B. Robinson4 recorded the jury's
answers to these questions as follows:
been accepted into evidence as an "admission by an agent," although at the time of
Russell, it was said that North Carolina law did not to permit the introduction of such
admissions if made subsequent to the completion of the transaction to which they relate.
WALTER S. LOCKHART, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE FOR NORTH
CAROLINA § 154 (1915). Under the Rules of Evidence adopted in 1984, admissions by
agents are generally admissible. 2 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §169 (3d ed. 1988).
38. Robert L. Leatherwood, a resident of Swain County, served in the state senate in
1893 and in the state house of representatives in 1899-1900. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERN-
MENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at 472, 478.
39. Trial Record (Russell I, 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898)).
40. William S. O'B. Robinson, a resident of Wayne County in eastern North Carolina,
had been elected to an eight-year term as a superior court judge in 1894. NORTH
CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at 579,596 n.71. The North Carolina
Constitution of 1868 as amended in 1876 required the rotation of superior court judges in
judicial districts. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §11 (1875) ("[E]very Judge of the Superior
Court shall reside in the district for which he is elected. The Judges shall preside in the
Courts of the different districts successively, but no Judge shall hold the Courts in the
same district oftener than once in four years .... ."). The changing boundaries of judicial
districts are charted in D.L. Corbitt, JudicialDistricts of North Carolina, 1746-1934,12 N.C.
HIST. REv. 45 (1935).
Judge Robinson had earlier been criticized by a Swain County newspaper:
When Judge Robinson left here at the close of his fall term of court, not a single
lawyer attended him to the depot. This morning every lawyer in town was at the
depot to bid Judge Timberlake "Bon Voyage."
Was there ever such a contrast between Judges as there has been at this and
last fall term of our court?
We overheard the Clerk of the Court say, that Judge Timberlake had been
one of the best judges and disposed of more business at this term than any Judge
since he had been in office. Nuf sed!
BRYSON CITY TINMEs (N.C.), June 19, 1896, at 1.
No stranger to criticism, Judge Robinson had written six months earlier to Henry
Groves Connor, thanking him for a supportive letter and describing his emotions at seeing
published "that I made an ass of myself in every County in which I had been, that I had
made use of obscene blasphemous language on the bench and that no member of the bar
dare come to my rescue." Letter from W.S. O'B. Robinson to H.G. Connor (Dec. 20,
1895) in H.G. Connor Papers (on file with the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson
Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
2038 [Vol. 73
MISUNDERSTOOD LESSONS
(1) "No. Busbee Trustee was the owner of the land."
(2) "Yes."
(3) "$686.84 with interest from January 1890."4'
Without reported explanation Judge Robinson entered judgment for
plaintiff4 At the prevailing legal rate of interest the total came to
$995.90, to which plaintiff's costs were to be added.
Defendants promptly appealed to the supreme court,43 which
heard the case during its February 1898 term. Rather than making a
decision on the merits, however, the court on May 3, 1898, ordered
a new trial because of a conflict in the record.' Although Judge
Robinson clearly reported the jury's findings as above, the trial record
itsel, also before the court on appeal, just as clearly recorded the
following answers:
(1) "No."
(2) "No. Busbee Trustee was the owner of the land."
(3) "$686.84 with interest from Jan. 1890." 4'
The crucial variance was in the answer to the second question-
whether defendants had converted plaintiff's property. According to
the trial record, in contrast to the judgment, the answer was in the
negative, presumably because the jury found the timber to be
Busbee's, not plaintiff's.
Although a clerical error in the record could be corrected on
appeal by a writ of certiorari or by amendment, 6 the repugnance in
this case was incurable: In its per curiam opinion the supreme court
reported that "counsel concur that the conflict is in the original record
41. Judgment (Russell , 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898)).
42. To sustain a judgment for plaintiff, while at the same time accepting Busbee's legal
title to the land, requires a rationale explaining how plaintiff acquired a property interest
in the timber. Various theories are discussed below. adverse possession of the land by
plaintiff's vendor, see infra text accompanying notes 76-78; title by accession, see infra note
78; and peaceful possession as itself a form of property, see infra text accompanying note
115.
43. North Carolina had no intermediate appellate court until 1967, when the Court of
Appeals was organized. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (1989) (implementing N.C. CONST. art.
IV, § 7).
44. Russell v. Hill, 122 N.C. 772, 773, 30 S.E. 27, 27 (1898) (per curiam).
45. Trial Record (Russell , 122 N.C. 772, 30 S.E. 27 (1898)). The same answers are
recorded in the Swain County Court Minute Books, August Special Term 1897, at 194
(Aug. 6, 1897).
46. State v. Beal, 119 N.C. 809,811,25 S.E. 815,815 (1896); State v. Preston, 104 N.C.
733, 734, 10 S.E. 84, 85 (1889).
1995] 2039
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below." 47 Because of such confusion the court concluded: "the only
remedy is by a new trial.,
41
III. RUSSELL: RoUND TWO
Remanded on May 3, 1898, Russell was tried a second time in
superior court on January 28, 1899. Waiving their right to trial by
jury,49 the parties, who were represented by the same counsel as
before,5 ° this time submitted the case for decision on an agreed
statement of facts. Together they stipulated that the grant to Busbee
was prior to that to McCoy and that "Busbee Trustee was the owner
of the land from which the timber was cut by virtue of this said
grant,"'" but that plaintiff had believed in good faith that McCoy,
from whom he purchased the timber, was the rightful owner.
Defendants conceded that they "did not claim right or title to the logs
by purchase or otherwise from Busbee Trustee."52 Without reported
explanation Judge H.R. Starbuck53 ruled that "plaintiff is not entitled
to recover in this action" and ordered him to pay defendants' costs.
5 4
47. Russell 1, 122 N.C. at 773, 30 S.E. at 27 (listing counsel as G.S. Ferguson for
plaintiff-appellee and R.L. Leatherwood for defendant-appellant).
48. Id.
49. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 18 ("In all issues of fact, joined in any court,
the parties may waive the right to have the same determined by a jury, in which case the
finding of the Judge upon the facts, shall have the force and effect of a verdict of a jury.").
The current provision, substantially the same, is in N.C. CONST. art . IV, § 14.
50. The firm of "Ferguson and Ferguson" was listed for plaintiff, as well as J.F. Ray,
"Jones and Johnson," and E.B. Norvell. One of plaintiff's papers was signed by G.A.
Jones, presumably of Jones and Johnson.
George A. Jones of Macon County served in the state house of representatives in
1889. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at 468. Appointed
to fill a vacancy, he was a superior court judge in 1901-02. Id. at 579, 597 n.89.
51. Facts Agreed Upon, Jan. 28, 1899 (Russell II, 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899)).
52. Id.
53. Henry R. Starbuck of Forsyth County in central North Carolina had been elected
to an eight-year term as a superior court judge in 1894. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT,
1585-1979, supra note 18, at 579, 597 n.73. He later served two terms in the state senate
(1909, 1911). Id. at 486, 488.
54. Swain County Court Minute Books, Spring Term 1899, p. 460 (June 26,1899). In
both rounds of Russell, defendants had asserted in their Answer the affirmative defense
of the statute of limitations: three years for conversion. See Code of North Carolina, ch.
10, 155(4) (1883) (current version codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(4) (1983)). That
defense may have been asserted at trial. If so, plaintiff's answer as forecast in his
Amended Complaint in Russell II, was that "this action was begun within the year next
after the judgment of nonsuit" in Hill v. Russell. In fact, more than two years but less
than three had elapsed: November 10, 1891 to January 17, 1894. See supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text. A confused passage in the Facts Agreed Upon seems to allude
to the statute of limitations. The handwritten passage, which seems to conflate the two
issues of defendants' presence in the jurisdiction and the statute of limitations appears
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Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, which decided the case
on December 19, 1899. 55 In an opinion by Justice Walter A.
Montgomery 56-the opinion that appears in the property
casebooks 57-the court affirmed the judgment for defendants. One
justice of the five-member court, Justice Robert M. Douglas,58
dissented without opinion.
IV. THE LAW IN RUSSELL
The reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Russell
was technical, but at its heart was a very practical proposition.
Plaintiff's cause of action sounded in trover, the remedy for conver-
sion. 9 Actually, since the forms of action had been abolished in
verbatim as follows:
Hill and Nelson the time of the alleged wrongful conversion and continuously up to
the commencement of this action and since nonresidents of the state that from the
alleged wrongful conversion to the commencement of this action they had occasionally
from year to year for short periods at a time been in the state and county for more
than three years from the alleged wrongful conversion elapsed before the commen-
cement of this action.
Facts Agreed Upon (Russell 11, 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899)).
Since Judge Starbuck did not divulge the basis of his judgment, there is no means of
knowing whether he relied on the statute of limitations. The supreme court later made
no mention of it. Russell v. Hill, 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899).
55. Russell v. Hill, 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899).
56. Walter A. Montgomery (1845-1921) had been elected in 1894 to fill an unexpired
term as an associate justice of the state supreme court; in 1896 he was elected to a full
eight-year term. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1979, supra note 18, at 576,589
n.9. Regarded as a Populist, Montgomery owed his election to the Republican-Populist
fusion. T.T. Hicks, Presentation of the Portrait of the Late Walter A. Montgomery to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, 186 N.C. 787, 796-97 (1923); Joseph F. Steelman,
Republican Party Strategists and the Issue of Fusion With Populists in North Carolina,
1893-1894, 47 N.C. HIsT. REV. 244 (1970).
Joining in Montgomery's opinion on the five-member court were Chief Justice William
T. Faircloth and Associate Justices Walter Clark and David M. Furches.
57. See supra note 3.
58. Robert M. Douglas (1849-1917) had been elected in 1896 to an eight-year term as
an associate justice of the state supreme court. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT,
1585-1979, supra note 18, at 576, 589 n30. The son of Stephen A. Douglas, Abraham
Lincoln's debating partner, Robert M. Douglas (unlike his father, a Republican) owed his
election to the Republican-Populist "fusion." 2 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA
BIOGRAPHY 98-99 (William J. Powell ed., 1986). He was impeached in 1900 by the
resurgent Democrats but was acquitted. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
59. The action of trover (trouv6 in Law French) was originally a form of trespass on
the case for the recovery of damages from a person who had found plaintiff's goods but
refused to return them. Because of procedural advantages the action was favored, and the
allegation of finding became a legal fiction. The action was thereby turned into one for
refusal to return plaintiff's goods however acquired, described as a conversion (or
appropriation) of the goods to the holder's own use. 3 WiLLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
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North Carolina in 1868, ° it was (as the court carefully observed) an
action "in the nature of the old action of trover."' Prior North
Carolina decisions were very clear that to recover in trover a plaintiff
had to show both title and possession. Although possession raised a
presumption of title, it was a presumption rebuttable by a clear
showing of title in another.62 Possession may be, as the old adage
says, nine-tenths of the law,' but the plaintiff in Russell was short
the crucial fraction.
The insistence on title in actions of trover was supported by the
logic of the old forms of action. Trespass was also a remedy for the
unauthorized taking of chattels. Over the centuries the common law
judges had sought to distinguish the two forms of action by aligning
them with the distinction between title and possession.64 Referring
to trover, the supreme court in an early North Carolina case observed:
"It is one of the characteristic distinctions between this action and
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *152-53 (1768). In Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. (11
Ired.) 80 (1850), the North Carolina Supreme Court summarized the law:
In trover, the injury done by the wrongful taking is waived, and the plaintiff supposes
he has lost the property, and alleges that the defendant found it and wrongfully
converted it to his own use. So the gist of the action is not that the defendant, having
found the property, took it into his possession, but that, after doing so, he wrongfully
converted it to his own use; and the measure of damage is the value of the property.
Id. at 81.
60. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 1, stated:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits shall be abolished, and there shall be in this State but one form of
action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private
wrongs which shall be denominated a civil action.
The current provision, substantially the same, is in N.C. CONST. art IV, § 13.
61. Russell II, 125 N.C. at 472, 34 S.E. at 640.
62. Boyce v. Williams, 84 N.C. 275,276-77 (1881); Rose v. Coble, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law)
517, 519 (1868); Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 80, 81 (1850); Laspeyre v.
McFarland, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 620, 621 (1817); Hostler's Adm'r v. Skull, 1 N.C. (ray.) 183,
183-84 (1801). The earliest of these North Carolina cases has been described as "the
earliest American decision on the question." J.E. Macy, Annotation, Mere Possession in
Plaintiff as Basis of Action for Wrongfully Taking or Damaging Personal Property, 150
A.L.R. 163, 176 (1944).
63. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1164 (6th ed. 1990). In light of the result in Russell,
the explanation given in Black's is interesting:
This adage is not to be taken as true to the full extent, so as to mean that the person
in possession can only be ousted by one whose title is nine times better than his, but
it places in a strong light the legal truth that every claimant must succeed by the
strength of his own title, and not by the weakness of his antagonist's.
Id.
64. 7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 402-31 (2d ed. 1937).
Holdsworth's account, in a particular not relevant to the present discussion, has recently
been criticized and described as a "heresy." C.D. Baker, The Jus Tertik A Restatement,
16 U. QUEENSLAND L. 46,46 (1990).
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trespass, that the latter may be maintained on possession; the former
only on property and the right of possession."65 In consequence, the
action of trover had become the means to try title to chattels:
"Trover is, to personals, what ejectment is as to the realty. '
In Russell, plaintiff should have at all costs avoided the charac-
terization of his action as in trover (or in the nature of trover). By
emphasizing the damage to possession, rather than to title, plaintiff
could have maintained his action in trespass (or in the nature of the
old action of trespass). The problem with that label was that the
measure of damages in trespass was not the value of the property but
rather the injury caused by the loss of possession,67 so plaintiff would
seemingly not have been able to claim the full value of the logs.
There is some evidence that plaintiff's lawyers perceived the
problem: In the superior court's minute book, Russell is labeled an
action of "debt,, 68 presumably some form of quasi-contract. Perhaps
this was an attempt to waive the tort, whether trover or trespass, and
sue in assumpsit for the value of defendants' unjust enrichment.69
Unfortunately for plaintiff, what defendants had done was soon being
called a conversion, for which every lawyer knew the remedy was
trover: Trover and conversion went together in legal lore like remedy
and wrong.7' Once title to the logs became the issue, plaintiff's
cause was almost certainly lost. The forms of action may have been
buried, but as the great English legal historian Frederic Maitland
65. Laspeyre, 4 N.C. (Taylor) at 621.
66. Id. When quoted later in Russell the phrasing became crisper: "Trover is to
personalty what ejectment is to realty." Russell II, 125 N.C. at 472, 34 S.E. at 640.
67. See Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 80, 81 (1850):
The bare possession is sufficient to maintain an action of trespass against a
wrongdoer, for the gist of that action is an injury to the possession, and the
measure of damage is not the value of the property, but the injury done to the
plaintiff by having his possession disturbed.
The old learning on trespass continues to be repeated by North Carolina courts. See
Motley v. Thompson, 259 N.C. 612, 618, 131 S.E.2d 447, 452 (1963): "The gist of trespass
to personalty is the injury to possession, and possession alone is sufficient to maintain
trespass against a wrongdoer." The latter case, however, applied as the apparent measure
of damages the value of the property. l
68. Swain County Cqurt Minute Books, Spring Term 1894, at 319 (June 14,1894); Fall
Term 1894, at 393 (Nov. 24, 1894); Spring Term 1895, at 456 (June 22, 1895); Fall Term
1895, at 512 (Nov. 27, 1895); Spring Term 1896, at 40 (June 16, 1896); Fall Term 1896, at
103 (Dec. 2, 1896); August Special Term 1897, at 194 (Aug. 6, 1897); Spring Term 1898,
at 336 (June 24, 1898).
69. For a brief history of waiver of tort, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 311 (2d ed. 1979).
70. See, e.g., EDWARD H. WARREN, TROVER AND CONVERSION: AN ESSAY 2 (1936)
("Conversion was the name of the wrong; trover was the name of the remedy.").
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trenchantly put it at almost that very moment, "they still rule us from
their graves."
71
The dead hand of legal history lay heavily on all traditionally
minded lawyers, but it was particularly heavy south of the
Mason-Dixon Line. An agrarian economy and atavistic social system
based on slavery had produced an antebellum legal culture of
common law conservatism.' It is indicative of North Carolina
society that the leading cases on trover cited in Russell in 1899 were
both "trover for a negro."'73 Abolition of the forms of action (like
abolition of slavery) came to Southern states such as North Carolina
in the knapsacks of Union soldiers. Rather than being a response to
demands from a society impatient with legal technicalities, law reform
was imposed as part of the state's Reconstruction Constitution of
1868.04 Demanding a wrenching change in settled ways of doing
legal business, reform imposed yet another demand on ill-prepared
practitioners already struggling to adjust to bewildering social and
71. F.W. Maitland, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 296
(A.H. Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker eds., 1929) (compiling lectures delivered during period
1888-1906).
72. Robert A. Ferguson has described the interaction of law and society in the South:
Regional peculiarities in the law itself reinforced the Southern lawyer's broad
social role. Because commercial law developed very slowly in the South, the
generalist ruled legal practice much longer than elsewhere, and his ability to unify
communal sympathies remained a vital professional skill. Then, too, the southern
lawyer always had to be more than a lawyer. As scholars have shown, the law
constituted just one of several competing modes of social order in the antebellum
South. The code of honor and slavery both impinged upon formal legal
prerogatives. The leaders of the Old South settled matters of slander, libel,
assault, battery, and other differences of opinion on the field of honor, bypassing
courtroom remedies and overtly breaking state laws that prohibited dueling. At
the same time, slavery barred a third of the South's population from the legal
rights of citizenship, and it placed the plantation owner above the law by allowing
him to wield absolute power over those people who were his personal property.
These tendencies were part of "the unwritten constitution of the Old South," and,
in restricting the meaning and application of the legal process, they created a
paradox. The more restricted the law became, the more expansive the lawyer had
to be.
ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETrERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 293-94 (1984).
73. Laspeyre v. McFarland, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 620, 621 (1817); accord Barvick v.
Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 80 (1850). The phrase also appears in Hostler's Adm'r v.
Skull, 1 N.C. (Tay. 152) 183, 183 (1801).
74. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 14 (1993).
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political upheaval.' Long after they had turned to dust, the old
forms of action continued to beguile North Carolina lawyers.
Conscientiously, and perhaps on its own motion since it appears
nowhere in the trial records, the supreme court considered an
argument that plaintiff actually had title: that McCoy, his vendor, had
been in adverse possession of the land from which he had cut the
timber. 6 Had that been the case, she would have had a title to pass
to him, since an adverse possessor acquires title to products severed
from the soil." The only remedy then available to the true owner,
"Busbee, trustee," would have been an action against her for damages
to the freehold. As a matter of fact, however, McCoy had not been
in actual possession of the land?8
75. See, e.g., H.G. Connor, Presentation of the Portrait of Hon. William T. Dortch to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 171 N.C. 841, 844-45 (1916):
It is not easy, at this day, to understand or appreciate the difficulties and
perplexities which confronted those men who, having passed the preparatory
period of life, living and working under conditions existing prior to the Civil War,
were called upon to act, and counsel others in acting, after four years of war,
ending disastrously and revolutionizing the political, social, and industrial life of
the South.
The adoption of the Code of Procedure, resulting in radical changes in the
procedural law, in which the lawyers of the age of Mr. Dortch were trained and
with which they were familiar, and other changes in the statute law of the State,
imposed upon them the necessity and duty of close application and study.
See also H.G. Connor, Presentation of the Portrait of Hon. George Howard to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, 173 N.C. 819, 830 (1917):
Referring to [Howard's] early retirement from the active pursuit of his
profession, one who from boyhood knew him well, spending some time as a
student in his office, says:
He was skilled in the system of pleading and practice of the Common Law,
and a strenuous opponent of the men and the methods by which the changes of
1868 were brought about. Yet he fully recognized many improvements and
advantages of the new system, and was one of the first men of the old regime
whom I heard commend the Code of Civil Procedure.
As required by N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. IV, § 2, a commission of three appointed by the
constitutional convention drafted the rules of practice: Ordinance of March 13, 1868, in
JOURNAL OF Ta CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
AT ITS SESSION 1868, at 439-42 (1868). The Code of Civil Procedure was adopted at the
special session of the General Assembly, 1868. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF NORTH
CAROLINA (1868).
76. Russell II, 125 N.C. at 472, 34 S.E. at 640.
77. Macy, supra note 62, at 239.
78. Unexamined in Russell is the further possibility that plaintiff had acquired an
original title to the logs by accession. Acting in the mistaken but good faith belief that he
had a right to enter the land and cut timber, plaintiff had, through the actions of his crew,
transformed standing trees into dressed logs assembled on the bank of a floatable stream.
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Beneath the technicalities in Russell lurked a very practical
question: If plaintiff had been awarded the value of the logs, where
would defendants have stood with respect to the true owner? As the
implications of treating trover as an action to try title to chattels had
been thought through, it had seemed clear that a judgment for
plaintiff in such an action should confer a right in rem, good against
all the world. A judgment against defendants, in other words,
appeared to amount to a judicial order of sale; satisfaction of the
judgment would then consummate a kind of purchase. Yet defen-
dants in Russell stood confessed in the agreed statement of facts of
having converted the property of the true owner: They "did not claim
right or title to the logs by purchase or otherwise from Busbee
Trustee."79 Defendants therefore remained liable to an action of
trover brought by Busbee, legal owner of the logs. Satisfaction of a
judgment for plaintiff in Russell would have been no defense.
"Consequently," the supreme court reasoned, adopting as its own the
language of an earlier case, "trover can never be maintained unless a
satisfaction of the judgment will have the effect of vesting a good title
His labor apparently added much of their value: Plaintiff had paid only $113.50 for timber
subsequently sold, after cutting and hauling, for $686.84-almost a sixfold increase. The
hundred-acre tract itself, and all that grew on it, had been sold by the state for only $12.50,
12-1/2 cents an acre. (It is true that the timber contract had been with Aaron Miller as well
as with Iowa McCoy. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. If Miller added rights to
cut trees on other land, the acreage would have been greater.).
The problem with a claim of title by accession, which may explain why plaintiff did
not assert it in Russell, was that in the traditional view it was grounded on a "change of
species," the standard examples being grapes changed into wine, olives into oil, wheat into
bread. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *404; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 363 (1836); 2 SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES: A TREATISE,
FROM A NORTH CAROLINA STANDPOINT, ON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AND
SECOND BOOKS OF THE COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE WHICH HAVE
NOT BECOME OBSOLETE IN THE UNITED STATES 1095-97 (1916). An innovative Northern
court under a strong-minded judge had already abandoned the old approach and
substituted a new one based on "relative values": A great increase in value attributable
to the expenditure of time and labor was held "of more importance in the adjustment than
any chemical change or mechanical transformation." Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,
320 (1871). But see Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 333, 337-38 (1877)
(indicating that a twofold increase in value of logs due to cutting and stacking was not
sufficient to implicate doctrine of title by accession).
The legal culture of the North Carolina judiciary, looking back as it did to the old
forms of action and less attuned to the market, was not likely to be fertile ground for such
an argument. Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 40 (1876) ("[M]ost of the American cases
hold that when the alteration of the timber taken by a trespasser has gone no farther than
its change into boards ... the owner of the timber may follow his property into the
manufactured article, and recover its value in that shape."). The logs still looked like
trees, and no one at the time probably thought of asking if title had nonetheless changed.
79. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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in the defendant."8  Implicitly, the court held that the same
reasoning applied with respect to an action "in the nature of the old
action of trover."
The continuing liability of defendants to an action of trover
brought by the true owner, even after satisfying an adverse judgment
in Russell, would indeed be troubling. Yet in such a hypothetical
case, Busbee v. Hill, the measure of damages would seem to be the
damage to the freehold. That is, the damages would be equal to the
value of the trees in place,81 presumably the price Russell paid
McCoy ($113.50), a sum well below the value of the logs when they
were subsequently sold.' Nor would defendants' liability to Busbee
have been avoided had Russell framed his complaint in trespass for
damage to his possession; defendants would still have been answer-
able to the true owner in trover or, for that matter, in trespass. In
addition, as a practical matter Hill and Nelson would seemingly be
able to assert a successful defense based on the statute of limitations.
Busbee's presence in the initial case of Hill v. Russell in 1890 would
seem to prevent him from denying knowledge of the operative facts.
Furthermore, one should not ignore that Russell, too, stood confessed
as a convertor, equally liable to an action by Busbee, unless barred by
the statute of limitations. 3 In fact, no possible outcome in Russell
80. Russell 11, 125 N.C. at 473,34 S.E. at 640 (quoting Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. (11
Ired.) 80, 82 (1850)). The quoted sentence concluded with an exception, albeit one not
applicable to the facts of Russell: "except where the property is restored and the
conversion was temporary." Al. (quoting Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired. 80, 82 (1850)). In
other words, if plaintiff in Russell had recaptured the logs from defendants, he would have
had a good cause of action in trover, despite the fact that satisfaction of the judgment by
defendants would not have vested title in them. How in this case trover could have been
distinguished from trespass was a question the judges were never able to answer.
81. The rule at the time was stated to be:
[W]here the action is brought for damages for logs cut and removed in the honest
belief on the part of the trespasser that he had title to them, the measure of
damages is the value in the woods from which they were taken, with the amount
of injury incident to removal, not at the mill where they were carried to be
sawed.
Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N.C. 86, 91, 20 S.E. 188, 189 (1894). It is assumed that the liability
of Hill and Nelson would be no greater than that of Russell.
Today double damages are provided by statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1(a) (1983),
although reimbursement from a third party is available in case of liability due to
"misrepresentation of property lines by the party letting the contract." Id. § 1-539.1(c).
82. Aaron Miller was co-promisee with Iowa McCoy. See supra text accompanying
note 23. Miller's contribution is unknown and thus cannot be valued.
83. Busbee would also seem to have causes of action against McCoy, who had made
entry and survey on his land and who purported to grant Russell the right to cut timber,
and against the Asheville Furniture and Lumber Company, the timber's ultimate
consumer.
1995] 2047
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
could provide either party a defense against the true owner, who was
not joined in the final suit. 4
The holding in Russell seemed to involve the court in a contradic-
tion of the leading English case of Armory v. Delamirie.' In that
case a chimney sweeper's boy found a jewel and delivered it to a
goldsmith for appraisal.86 The goldsmith refused to return it to the
boy, who brought an action of trover for its value.' The Court of
King's Bench ruled that the action would lie even though the boy was
not the true owner.88 It is noteworthy that Armory dated to the
early eighteenth century, before the logical development of the
distinction between trespass and trover was complete. Yet over the
years Armory had never been overruled, only confined. The finder
of the jewel was described by the Russell court, somewhat disin-
genuously, as "the owner because of having it in possession,"89 and
the court emphasized the fact that in Armory the true owner was not
known: "[T]he case would have been very different if the owner had
been known."90
In a case such as Armory it is rather difficult to imagine how the
identity of the true owner could ever be known. There is generally
no registered owner of chattels; engraved initials, even a full name,
are no more than evidence of ownership. In Russell, by contrast, the
name of the owner was established as a fact: Plaintiff agreed to it in
the statement of the case. When defendants in Russell asserted the
defense of jus tertii, therefore, they were actually asserting the rights
of a named individual: EH. Busbee, trustee.
Whether or not Busbee was actually present in the supreme court
chambers in Raleigh at the moment the decision in Russell was
announced cannot now be determined, but his presence there would
not have been surprising: Busbee was, in fact, a leading advocate
before the state supreme court. He appeared in a case decided the
same day as Russell, a case in which, incidentally, counsel for
84. Failure to interplead the true owner, it has been argued, would constitute
acceptance by defendants of the risk of double liability. BURKE, supra note 2, at 141.
85. 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
86. Id.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Russell II, 125 N.C. at 473, 34 S.E. at 641. In Armory the English court had
described the finder as having "such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but
the rightful owner." Armory, 1 Strange at 505, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
90. Russell II, 125 N.C. at 474, 34 S.E. at 641 (citing Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. (11
Ired.) 80, 82 (1850)).
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opposing sides in Russell had together represented the other party.9
A specialist in the emerging field of corporate law, Busbee had
enjoyed the lucrative and powerful position of attorney for the
Southern Railway Company for over a decade.92
Not only prominent before the bench, Busbee was also known
personally to every member of the court. Justice Montgomery, who
authored the opinion of the court in Russell, numbered Busbee among
his dearest friends,93 and Montgomery's memorialist linked the two
at a prominent event thirty years earlier.94 Justice David M. Fur-
ches, who had joined in Montgomery's Russell opinion, and Justice
Douglas, the sole dissenter in Russell, soon were linked very publicly
with Busbee: The cause cldbre of 1901 in North Carolina was the
impeachment of the two justices, and Busbee served on the defense
team.95 The prosecution ultimately failed, in part perhaps because
91. Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474, 474-75, 34 S.E. 634, 634 (1899) (listing G.F.
Bason and F.H. Busbee for appellant-defendants; T.H. Cobb, R.L. Leatherwood, and G.S.
Ferguson for appellee-plaintiff).
92. Memorial of Fabius Haywood Busbee, 11 N.C. B. ASS'N REP. 177, 178 (1909).
93. See Autobiography of Walter A. Montgomery 74 in Montgomery Papers (on file
with the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill):
Of all my friends at the time I was retired from office [1905], Mr. Fabius
Haywood Busbee was the most actively sympathetic and helpful. I had known
him more than forty years; and our relations were friendly throughout that entire
time. His interest in my future welfare was redoubled because of the intimate
relations between our wives. They had been all their lives like sisters. But for
Mr. Busbee's generosity and assistance in aiding me to procure legal business
after my retirement from the bench, my financial situation would have been much
embarrassed. He not only wished me well-I think many others did that,
too-but he showed that interest by his works. He had me employed in cases
that brought me good fees ....
Id.
94. Hicks, supra note 56, at 791:
That summer [1867] he attended the commencement at Chapel Hill, saw
President [Andrew] Johnson made an honorary member of the literary society,
and was himself, on motion, made an honorary member, and signed his name just
under that of the president. Mr. [William H.] Seward [Secretary of State]
excused himself from accepting the honor because he had never been a member
of a secret society, when Mr. Fab Busbee, knowing, as ever, what to say, moved
a suspension of the rules in the case of Secretary Seward, and he signed up just
under the name of Walter A. Montgomery.
The occasion is described in 1 KEMP P. BATTLE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA 759-63 (1907).
95. TRIAL OF DAVID M. FURCHES, NOW CHIEF JUSTICE, AND FORMERLY ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE, AND ROBERT M. DOUGLAS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS vi (1901) (listing counsel for respondents); id. at 791-820
(providing a transcript of "Speech of F.H. Busbee, of Counsel for the Respondents").
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of Busbee's lawyerly talents, but in larger part because of a split in
the political ranks. 6 The true owner in Russell was hardly, there-
fore, a bodiless abstraction to the justices who decided the case.
The reason, of course, that title could be so readily located in
Russell was the peculiar nature of the personalty involved-severed
realty, for which (at least in the original form of standing timber)
there was a record owner. Plaintiff's lawyer seems, nonetheless, to
have conceded too much when he agreed on behalf of his client that
"Busbee Trustee was the owner of the land from which the timber
was cut.",9 7 Trover may indeed have been an action to try title to
chattels, functioning in the same manner for personalty as ejectment
functioned for realty, but it could not simply be turned into an action
in ejectment. Strictly speaking, the most plaintiff need have conceded
about Busbee's title was that it was apparent or record title, and a
bare legal title at that, since the grant ran to "Busbee, as trustee."
Whether Busbee's title to the land was defective could not be
established in an action in which neither Busbee, McCoy, nor any
other interested parties were joined."
In every state a title search would have revealed the identity of
the record owner, but in North Carolina record ownership was
accorded even greater weight. On December 1, 1885, the state's
race-type recording act, the Connor Act, went into effect;99 exactly
eighteen months later, on June 1, 1887, Busbee recorded his deed to
the land from which the disputed timber came." By eliminating
notice of prior conveyances as an issue in determining priority of
recorded deeds,'0 ' the Connor Act increased the security of record
96. The removal of the Republican justices was a project of the Democratic Party, a
large majority of whose members supported it, but a minority-led by Henry Groves
Connor-opposed it. For a memoir of the trial, focusing on Connor's role, see Josephus
Daniels, Presentation of the Portrait of Hon. Henry Groves Connor to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, 196 N.C. 830, 851-63 (1929).
97. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
98. Although Busbee was described in the deed as "trustee," it appears to have been
the law of North Carolina at the time that, without further evidence of the identity of the
beneficiary and terms of the trust, no trust was created and the trustee took an
unrestricted fee simple. See Freeman v. Rose, 192 N.C. 732, 733-34, 135 S.E. 870, 871
(1926). The current law on this issue is in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 43-63 to 43-64 (1984)
(providing that unless recorded instrument in chain of title sets forth name of beneficial
owner, "trustee" has full power to dispose of real property).
99. Act of Feb. 27, 1885, ch. 147, §5, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws 233, 234.
100. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
101. The effect of a race-type recording act is described by two modem authorities as
follows: "[I]t is a pure question of race to the records; the purchaser who first records
wins." LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK FOR MORE EFFICIENT CONVEYANCING 18 (1961).
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title. Its avowed aim had been to facilitate mortgage financing and
thereby improve credit in the state.'O' There was no dispute in
Russell about Busbee's priority over McCoy: He had clearly won the
race to the courthouse. The lawyers who litigated the case were still
working through the implications of the new race-type statute, but the
statute's adopters had recently and publicly assured them of one
thing: a record title would be extremely difficult to defeat. The
admitted fact that Busbee's recorded deed was filed prior to McCoy's
was almost proof positive of ownership.
Anderson v. Gouldberg,'" the contemporaneous Minnesota case
with which Russell is unfavorably compared, also involved logs, and
that decision also rested on a very practical proposition, but unlike
the reasoning in Russell, the reasoning in Anderson was not hyper-
technical. Plaintiff, who suffered the loss of certain logs that
defendants took without authority, brought an action for their
recovery or for their value.4  A jury trial in the District Court for
Isanti County resulted in a judgment for plaintiff in the amount of
$153.45.5 The Minnesota Supreme Court, which affirmed the
judgment, treated the case as one sounding in replevin, the old form
of action for the restitution of goods wrongfully taken."'° The
"The best argument in favor of the race statute ... is that it enables the title searcher to
rely upon the records without the substantial risk under other types of acts that one will
have constructive notice of unrecorded instruments." Corwin W. Johnson, Purpose and
Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IowA L. REV. 231, 232-33 (1962).
102. See Robert W. Winston, A Century of Law in North Carolina, 176 N.C. 763, 771
(1919) (commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the state
supreme court). Winston noted that:
Perhaps the wisest of these remedial statutes is the Connor Act of 1885,
requiring all deeds to be registered, and practically placing an unregistered deed
on a footing with an unregistered mortgage. Prior to said act, no one could with
safety make a loan on North Carolina lands, and foreign capital avoided the
State.
Id.
It is an exaggeration to describe the Connor Act as "requiring all deeds to be
registered," but it is a pardonable exaggeration since the security of title offered by the act
makes recording extremely attractive. Still, an unrecorded deed is valid between the
parties. Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550,552-53, 5 S.E.2d 849, 850-51 (1939); Weston v.
J.L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 266, 75 S.E. 800, 801 (1912); Warren v. Williford,
148 N.C. 474, 479, 62 S.E. 697, 699 (1908); Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N.C. 166, 170-71, 16
S.E. 16, 17 (1892).
103. 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892).
104. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 294 (1892).
105. 1d
106. Originally the remedy for wrongful distress (seizure of goods to secure the
payment of a claimed debt, particularly rent), 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *145-46,
replevin was generalized in America to become the remedy for any unlawful taking,
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Minnesota court's relaxed attitude toward the technicalities of the
forms of action is evident in its willingness to view the case as one in
replevin despite the award of money damages, the characteristic
remedy for trover (or trespass), but even more in its disregard of
common law precedents requiring plaintiffs in replevin to prove title
as well as prior possession -- precedents that parallel those relied
on in Russell with respect to the old action of trover.
Spare as was the record in Russell, that in Anderson was sparer
still. While the jury in Russell I was asked three questions-Was
plaintiff's grantor the owner of the land? Did defendants take the
logs without authority? What were the logs worth?-the jury in
Anderson was presented only the last two. Although plaintiff in
Anderson admitted that he had cut the timber on land belonging to
a stranger, and although the specific section, township, and range
were given, making the identification of the particular stranger
relatively easy,"~ the trial judge refused to permit plaintiff's title to
be questioned and limited the issue to whether defendants' taking was
authorized."° The record on appeal in Anderson, therefore, con-
tained no finding of fact concerning the state of plaintiff's title, thus
enabling a well-known scholar years later to limit the case
severely."' The Minnesota Supreme Court made clear, however,
that as far as it was concerned the limited state of the record was of
no consequence: "For the purposes of this appeal, we must...
assume the fact to be (as there was evidence from which the jury
might have so found) that the plaintiffs [sic] obtained possession of
the logs in the first instance by trespassing upon the land of some
JEROME MICHAEL, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY 16-19 (1948).
107. Presgrave v. Saunders, 2 Ld. Raym. 984, 985, 92 Eng. Rep. 156, 156 (K.B. 1704);
Butcher v. Porter, 1 Salkend 94, 94, 91 Eng. Rep. 87, 87 (K.B. 1693); Wildman v. North,
2 Lev. 92, 92, 83 Eng. Rep. 465, 465 (K.B. 1673); see 7 HOLDSWVORTH, supra note 64, at
427-28.
108. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294 (1892), identified the land in question:
Plaintiff claimed to have cut the logs on section 22, township 27, range 25, Isanti
County, in the winter of 1889-1890, and to have hauled them to a mill on section
6, from which place defendants took them. The title to section 22 was in
strangers, and plaintiff showed no authority from the owners to cut logs thereon.
Id. at 294.
109. Id. ("The court charged that even if plaintiff got possession of the logs as a
trespasser, his title would be good as against any one except the real owner.., and left
the case to the jury on the question as to whether the logs were cut ... by defendants
under... authority.")
110. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 95 n.18 (citing Anderson as a case in which plaintiff was
in possession "under some colorable claim of right," without, however, identifying the
source of the "claim of right").
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third party.""' The question on appeal, therefore, could be for-
mulated to be whether "bare possession of property, though wrongful-
ly obtained, is sufficient title" to permit plaintiff to maintain an action
for unauthorized taking." Answering the question in the affir-
mative, the court relied on the venerable precedent of Armory v.
Delamirie." Generalizing from Armory, the court stated the
sweeping rule: "One who has acquired the possession of property,
whether by finding [as in Armory], bailment, or by mere tort [as
arguably was the case in Anderson], has a right to retain that
possession as against a mere wrongdoer who is a stranger to the
property.""1
4
The implication of this rule, as the court explicitly acknowledged,
was that "possession is good title against all the world except those
having a better title."' "u It is the exception, of course, that is of
interest. Rights in rem-that is, property rights-are good against all
the world without exception. By contrast, rights in personam are
good against only a limited class or classes. The view of property
expressed in Anderson falls somewhere in between these two axioms
and implies the possibility of a series of titles to the same thing, one
better than the other, a view that might without too much exag-
geration be expressed as the Theory of Relativity of Titles. Posses-
sion does more, according to this theory, than raise a presumption of
title; possession is title, albeit one possibly inferior to some higher title
or titles.
111. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892). The sole plaintiff in
Anderson was Sigfrid Anderson, 51 Minn. 294, 294 (1892).
112. Anderson, 53 N.W. at 637.
113. 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
114. Anderson, 53 N.W. at 637. Without apparent recognition of the fact, the court in
Anderson was repeating an association of ideas propounded a decade earlier by Oliver
Wendell Holmes:
The meaning of the rule that all bailees have the possessory remedies is, that in
the theory of the common law every bailee has a true possession, and that a
bailee recovers on the strength of his possession, just as a finder does, and as
even a wrongful possessor may have full damages or a return of the specific thing
from a stranger to the title.
THE COMMON LAW 138 (1881).
Within a few years of the decision in Anderson, Dean James Barr Ames wrote of the
action of trover: "[T]he plaintiff need not prove that the chattel was his own property, or
that he was in actual possession of it. It is enough to show actual possession as a bailee,
finder, or trespasser, or to prove merely an immediate right of possession." James Barr
Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARv. L. REv. 277, 277 (1897).
115. Anderson, 53 N.W. at 637. This is an extension of Armory, which held only that
a finder acquires "such a property" as will support the action. 1 Strange at 505, 93 Eng.
Rep. at 664.
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For all its appearance of modernity--eschewing absolutes and
stressing relative values-this theory is in fact consonant with the
medieval approach to property. Once the ancient writ of right fell
into disuse, replaced for all practical purposes by the petty assizes of
mort d'ancestor and novel disseisin, title to real property in England
became a relative concept."6 Only by a slow process, beginning in
the sixteenth century and not complete until the nineteenth, was
absolute title to reemerge as a functional idea. It was precisely
because Annory was decided as early as it was, before this process
was complete, that the Minnesota Supreme Court could rely on it so
confidently in Anderson, while the North Carolina Supreme Court felt
so uncomfortable with it in Russell.
What clinched the result in Anderson was not precedent but
policy. As in Russell, the Anderson court addressed a very practical
problem, but while in Russell the problem concerned the defen-
dants-if the judgment went against them, where would they stand
with respect to the true owner?-in Anderson the concern was for the
plaintiff-unless "bare possession" was protected against unauthorized
taking, property would be insecure. The Anderson decision is the
perfect epitome of one strand of 1890s legal culture, valuing security
of property above all else."7 Acquisitive capitalism was then viewed
as sound economic policy, and in the age of the "robber barons" '
possession was to be protected without too much inquiry into its
provenance. The concluding sentence in Anderson is its oft-repeated
policy argument, a classic argumentum ad horrendum: "Any other
rule would lead to an endless series of unlawful seizures and reprisals
in every case where property had once passed out of the possession
of the rightful owner.""' It is perhaps this argument that is Ander-
son's clearest mark of modernity.
The reasoning in Russell, too, involved a policy argument, after
a fashion, but one so old-fashioned as almost to escape the notice of
modem readers. The policy vindicated in Russell was the age-old
116. See BAKER, supra note 69, at 201-02.
117. See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
ATITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 69-81, 105-06 (1960).
118. See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN
CAPITALISTS, 1861-1901 (1934). Josephson's concept of the "robber barons" stimulated
a once-lively literature. See, eg., Edward C. Kirkland, The Robber Barons Revisited, 66
AM. HIST. REv. 68, 68-73 (1960); Allen Solganick, The Robber Baron Concept and Its
Revisionists, 29 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 257 (1965).
119. Anderson, 53 N.W. at 637; see also BROWN, supra note 9, at 312 (quoting and
approving this policy argument).
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judicial concern for keeping the forms of action distinct: If plaintiff
had won his action "in the nature of the old action of trover," then
what would have remained of the distinction between that old action
and the other old action of trespass? The reasoning in Anderson
avoided such theological niceties and directly posed the stark modern
question: What would the consequences be, not for the parties but
for society, of holding for defendants? The result envisioned by the
court was nothing short of anarchy.
And yet, of course, the very rule rejected in Anderson was
adopted in Russell without the dire social consequences predicted. If
a state is indeed, in Justice Brandeis' memorable phrase, a laboratory
in which social and economic experiments may be conducted,"2 then
North Carolina has experimented for almost a century with a
dangerous rule without triggering "an endless series of unlawful
seizures and reprisals."'' Nor, on the contrary, have the courts of
Minnesota been converted into tribunals for the protection of thieves'
ill-gotten gains.
V. LEGAL HISTORY
For more than a century, American legal education has been
based on the study of appellate cases such as Russell and Ander-
son." The "case method," coupled with the newly emergent law
reviews, quickly spawned the characteristic form of published student
material: case notes and comments." Russell itself was promptly
noted by the student editors of the Harvard Law Review, who found
its doctrine "indefensible."'" Professional literature, too, followed
the fashion and focused on cases: In the American Law Reports, first
120. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121. The failure of the predicted consequences to appear was noticed earlier. R.H.
Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1221, 1223 (1986) ("The possibility of 'endless seizures' is a specter more
theoretically frightening than real."); Macy, supra note 62, at 215 ("It is curious to observe
... that in states which have adhered to the property rule [requiring plaintiff to show title],
there have been no 'endless series of unlawful seizures and reprisals.' Most of the cases
have been those of unfortunate sheriffs.").
122. The establishment of the case method as the standard form of legal education is
associated with the deanship of C.C. Langdell at Harvard Law School, 1870-95. ROBERT
STEvENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980S 36 (1983).
123. See Michael I. Swygert and Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and
Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.L 739, 777 (1985).
124. Recent Case, 13 HARv. L. REV. 607, 607 (1900). Russell was inconsistent with
Harvard Dean James Barr Ames's view of the law of trover. See supra note 114.
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established as a series in 1919, the steadily lengthening "annotations"
were really essays on various legal topics. In 1944, a ninety-two page
annotation was dedicated to the question of whether mere possession
could support an action of trover; the annotation was perfunctorily
appended to a twelve-page reported case."'
Tardily, but perhaps inevitably, legal historians have made cases
the objects of research. While favoring great constitutional cases for
obvious reasons,126 scholars have not ignored less momentous cases
made familiar to generations of law students by coverage in required
first-year courses."z Always enriching the particular case with a
wealth of hitherto unknown detail, these studies rarely if ever
expressly address the issue of how they should inform classroom
discussion. Without attempting to answer that question in other cases,
this study can at least address it in this one.
Russell is a fascinating and troubling case because, stripped of all
its technicalities, it starkly presents for decision the following dispute:
A owned land; B thought she owned the same land and sold
C the right to cut trees on it; C cut the trees and removed
the logs in good faith; D took the logs with no authority
from anyone else and sold them to E. C sues D for the
value of the logs. Who wins?
The first point about this question is that it was actually asked in a
real courtroom; it is not a mere hypothetical question, posed in a
125. Macy, supra note 62, at 163-254 (comprising an annotation on New England Box
Co. v. C & R Construction Co., 49 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1943)).
126. E.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCoTr
CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECIIVE (1981); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994); PAUL
KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER v. NEW
YORK (1990); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); STANLEY I.
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE
(1971); ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964) (detailing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)); C. PETER MAGRATH, YAzOO: LAW AND POLmCS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
127. E.g., A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY
OF THE TRAGIC LAST VOYAGE OF THE MIGNONETTE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE (1984) (discussing Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 560 (1885)) (review by John V. Orth in 16 ALBION 440 (1984));
Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 249 (1975); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the
Century, 39 S.C. L. REv. 415 (1988) (discussing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118
N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)); A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the
Carbolic Smoke Ball, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1985) (discussing Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke
Ball Co., 2 Q.B. 484 (1892), 1 Q.B. 256 C.A. (1893)).
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classroom. All the alphabet characters have real names (which,
incidentally, students usually find much easier to handle). Use of a
specific case lends an air of actuality to the discussion that focuses
both teacher and student on the practical problems of decision
making.' s Long ago, even before the first process was issued in
Russell, an early defender of the case method and pioneer property
law teacher, John Chipman Gray, pointed out that "dealing with
actual cases is an effectual corrective to unreal and fantastic
speculation, which is the most dangerous tendency of academic
education."' 29
That the question in Russell is not hypothetical does not,
however, require extended historical research for demonstration: the
case as reported makes that clear. What research can do is to restore
the context of the reported case. Every lawyer and judge in the
courtroom when the decision in Russell was announced knew RH.
Busbee (A in the above formula), and knew him as a man well able
to look after his own affairs.' The "third person" whose right is
asserted by defendant was no shadowy abstraction, and his concrete
identification may make the decision in Russell more defensible.'
In addition to .restoring the context of the decision, historical
research can illuminate the process by which the record in the case
was created. Plaintiff's attorney made an initial mistake in permitting
the action to be categorized as one "in the nature of the old action of
trover": North Carolina law made title an issue in actions of tro-
ver," but state law did not dictate how title was to be established.
128. Had Russell never arisen, it is likely that property teachers would have invented
it as a hypothetical case.
129. Letter from John Chipman Gray to Editors, 1 YALE L.J. 159, 160 (1892).
130. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
131. See, eg., BURKE, supra note 2, at 140:
[Tihe final and dispositive argument for the Russell court is the possibility
of double liability for the convertor who pays a trover judgment, receives the
plaintiff's rights in the timber, but is still forced to pay the timber's value a
second time to the true owner who later sues. Protection against multiple
liability is perhaps the most cited rationale for accepting a jus tertii defense.
Under the facts of Russell v. Hill, the result there may be justified, because
the true owner is known. He is an adjoining landowner. He is nearby and his
proximity makes the concern of the Armory [sic: read Russell] court a real one.
It is not exactly accurate to describe the true owner, F.H. Busbee, as "an adjoining
landowner." He was in fact an out-of-town attorney who held legal title to over 10,000
acres from a small part of which the logs at issue were cut. That Busbee knew of the
dispute between Russell and Hill is shown by his intervention in the initial action, Hill v.
Russell. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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In a second mistake, in what became the decisive bench trial in 1899
(Russell II), plaintiff's attorney stipulated that title to the land-and
therefore to the trees cut from it-was in Busbee, trustee. 33 While
that conceded too much, since only record title was established, it has
been shown that the concession was made in the context of the state's
new race-type recording act, the Connor Act, widely touted as
granting well-nigh complete security to record title.'
With regard to the supreme court's reliance on the distinction
between trespass and trover, it has been pointed out that although the
forms of action had been abolished in North Carolina three decades
earlier, the older generation of lawyers in the state had found the
change profoundly unsettling.3  Southern legal conservatism,
established in the static and traditional society of the antebellum
period, was, if anything, reinforced by the social restoration of the
post-Reconstruction era. Russell stands as a monument, albeit a small
one, to the enduring conservatism of the legal profession in the state.
What historical research cannot supply in this case is the moral
reality behind the agreed facts. Did defendants take possession of the
logs because of a good faith belief that they, rather than Busbee,
owned the land on which the timber stood, as Hill v. Russell would
imply? 6 Or were they engaged in a not-so-subtle scheme to
deprive plaintiff of the fruits of his labor, misusing the legal process
to that end, as their agent's alleged enjoyment of the "joke on
Russell"" 7 would indicate? While not, strictly speaking, relevant to
the decision, if indeed title and not good faith was the only issue, that
moral judgment would at least be helpful in evaluating the effect of
the rule in Russell. What is troubling about the opposite rule, the one
adopted in Anderson, is that it may protect wrongdoing plaintiffs. If
the contrary rule were seen to protect wrongdoing defendants, it
would lose some of its appeal. On this point, however, research is
unavailing, and the past remains inscrutable.
VI. LESSONS
Like any decision based more on precedent than on policy,
Russell sought to apply in the present the lessons of the past. With
regard to whether title was an essential element of plaintiff's case in
133. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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an action of trover, the state's case law was clear: It was. 138
Whether the requirement of title in trover, as opposed to mere
possession in trespass, should continue to matter after the creation of
a unified cause of action was a significant question that went unasked
in Russell. The implied answer, of course, was yes. Continuing to
apply the rules of the past in the changed circumstances of the present
was not, however, necessarily keeping faith with the past. The lessons
of history hold true in the present only ceteris paribus, "other things
being equal," which they never are."
Looming large over North Carolina decisional law was the great
common law case of Armory v. Delamirie,'4 the Chimney Sweep's
Case. Decided when the common law system of forms of action was
still viable, that case nonetheless held that a mere finder could
maintain an action of trover for the value of a found item that was
wrongfully withheld from him. Armory allowed the finder the same
remedy that a bailee would have, despite the fact that a voluntary
bailee is entrusted with possession by the owner, while a finder simply
takes possession; the similarity of lawful possession in both cases
overshadowed the difference in the means by which possession had
been acquired.' Russell distinguished Armory on the ground that
the true owner in that case was not known. By contrast, Anderson
likened Armory to any case involving possession, on the ground that
possession alone-even possession "wrongfully obtained"-could
support the action. It may be that both Russell and Anderson
misunderstood the lesson of Armory: Russell cabined it too narrowly,
while Anderson read it too broadly. It is suggested that the proper
reading of Armory is that it protects good faith possessors: bailees
and finders, certainly, but also innocent trespassers. Only if defen-
dants can show that plaintiff acquired possession by intentional
wrongdoing, should title in another (jus tertii) matter.'42 If that
138. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
139. The author made this same point in a different context. JOHN V. ORTH, THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 158 (1987).
140. 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
141. Finding is sometimes said to create a "quasi-bailment." BROWN, supra note 9, at
30, 320.
142. Innocent mistake is not a defense to an action by the true owner; this is necessary
to protect the property. Dan B. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina: Part L The
Substantive Law, 47 N.C. L. REV. 31, 32-33 (1968). Yet the rationale does not necessarily
extend to suits over mere possession like Russell and Anderson. Even if defendants are
permitted to assertjus tertii as a defense, they are not subrogated to the rights of the third
person but are permitted only to show the fact of the third person's rights.
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reading of Armory is correct, then Russell (and prior North Carolina
case law) was wrong: Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, and
defendants should have been able to asseftjus tertii only if they could
first have shown that plaintiff was a willful wrongdoer. On the other
hand, Anderson was too loose in its formulation: A technical
wrongdoing, such as an innocent trespass, as the source of possession
should not disable the possessor from securing judicial protection
against an unauthorized taking, but a willful trespass at the root of
title should. Plaintiff in Russell, in other words, deserved a new trial
at which to show, not his title, but his bonafides. Likewise, defendant
in Anderson deserved a new trial to show that plaintiff had obtained
possession through willful wrongdoing.' 4'
Policy may beguile as surely as precedent. If Russell looked
longingly toward the past, Anderson looked fearlessly toward the
future, yet the policy argument it made is as surely flawed as the lame
precedent in Russell. "Any other rule" than the one applied in
Anderson, protecting possession no matter how acquired, would lead
(so the Minnesota Supreme Court predicted) "to an endless series of
unlawful seizures and reprisals in every case where property had once
passed out of the possession of the rightful owner."'" It has already
been remarked that another rule, applied in North Carolina for
almost a century, has not resulted in these dire consequences. The
reason it has not should be a cautionary lesson to the whole legal
community, from beginning law students to practitioners to law
professors and judges. Before talking loosely about the consequences
of a decision, not to the parties but to society at large, one must first
ascertain whether anyone is really listening. A few laws, mostly
criminal or tax laws, speak to the public directly; many others, such
as laws concerning deeds and wills, communicate through the legal
profession.' 5 Only rules that people generally consult before taking
specific action will shape that action. Rules such as the one invoked
in Anderson will rarely, as a practical matter, influence behavior. The
best policy with regard to policy arguments in such cases is to keep
quiet.
In Russell, for all its backwardness, the policy argument con-
cerned exclusively legal behavior in the narrow sense: what to prove
143. Such results would comport with what research has shown modem judges actually
do. See Helmholz, supra note 121, at 1223-24.
144. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 637, 637 (Minn. 1892).
145. See John V. Orth, Requiemfor the Rule in Shelley's Case, 67 N.C. L. REV. 681,693
(1989).
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in order to make a case. That, it is submitted, is the right kind of
argument, although it has already been suggested that the particular
answer in Russell was atavistic. This is not to praise legalism or
technicality as such. Courts should consider the social implications of
their decisions but not indulge bizarre conjectures of unlikely
consequences. The proper concern in Russell was with judicial
efficiency: Should a court adjudicate a possessory dispute between
plaintiff and defendants when it is conceded by both sides that title is
in a third party? The proper concern in Anderson was with judicial
integrity: Should courts protect possession wrongfully acquired?
Such concerns are significant, but above all they are manageable by
the courts. "Unreal and fantastic speculation" is as out of place in the
courtroom as in the classroom.

